

Ivry, 8 September 1998

MEMO N° 15 TO BERNARD CAZENEUVE

During his hearing by our mission on 19 May 1998, General Christian Quesnot explained to us that he had sent a memo to the President of the Republic in May 1991, *“not because SAM 16 missiles had been found in the field, but because he had judged this phenomenon very worrying in terms of proliferation”*, due to the *“danger it represented within Africa of seeing civil or military aircraft brought down.”*

In the report from the Belgium Senate, this surface-to-air threat was also mentioned (chapter S.5.1). It was explained that to address it, a C 130 transport aeroplane of the 15th Wing equipped with electronic counter-measures (ECM) was land in Kigali on 6 April 1994.

To address this danger, sufficiently serious that General Quesnot felt he had to alert the President in May 1991, we can assume that the Falcon 50 offered by France to President Habyarimana had also been equipped with such counter-measures. This was all the more logical since the French team was composed of *“ex-AA”*, as specified in all the reports of DMAT-Air, i.e. ex-officials of the Air Army trained in their use and made aware of the threat. Has this point been verified?

The response has some importance. According to whether it is negative or positive, it in fact induces a very different level of technicality on the part of the attackers who executed the attack against the presidential aeroplane.

Jean-Claude Lefort

Copy to Mr Drain